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A GENEALOGY OF CALCULATIONS AT AN EARLY QUEENSLAND 
SUGAR MILL  
ABSTRACT 
 
This study of a unique historic situation is sociologically framed and politically 
contextualised. It examines the technical and persuasive rhetorical dimensions of 
calculations employed at a 19th century Queensland sugar plantation and mill in 
relation to the employment of indentured labour. Historical archival data is interpreted 
through the lens of the rhetoric of rationality. Queensland legislation permitted the 
employment of indentured Pacific islanders to assist in the development of its sugar 
industry. Accounting practices employed at the Colonial Sugar Refinery (CSR) 
Company’s Goondi Plantation and Mill focused on recording and controlling labour 
costs to maximize profits and maintain a healthy dividend to shareholders. The use of 
this single perspective, while it provides a restricted interpretation of events, 
nevertheless enables some unique insights about the practice of accounting in this 
historic context.  
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Introduction 
This paper examines the technical and persuasive rhetorical dimensions (Carruthers 
and Espeland, 1991) of a specific genealogy of calculation (Miller and Napier, 1993) 
located “local in both space and time” (Carnegie and Napier, 1996, p. 7). The 
institutional setting is the highly politicised early Queensland sugar industry and the 
time is the late 1800s. The calculative techniques are those employed by the Colonial 
Sugar Refining (CSR) Company at its Goondi sugar plantation and mill in north 
Queensland. The rhetoric is the economic argument used by CSR both internally and 
externally, to rationalise its employment of indentured Pacific islanders1.  
Internally, the close attention paid to costs was a constant reminder to managers and 
employees that the continuation of the business, and their employment, depended on 
their ability to operate at a profit. This provided the justification for the employment 
of cheap islander labour. Externally, economic arguments for this practice were put 
forward to the government to argue for favourable legislation, to shareholders as a 
means of maintaining good dividends, and to the general public. They needed to be 
persuaded that the success of the fledgling sugar industry was vital to Queensland’s 
economic prosperity, and that this success hinged on a steady supply of cheap labour 
The colony of Queensland separated from New South Wales in 1859 (Gott, 1997), 
and was then preoccupied with overcoming the lack of affordable, available and 
reliable labour to develop its coastal lands (Barker and Byford, 1988). Sugar 
production was agriculturally appropriate and, at the time, “a good economic 
prospect”2 (Andrew and Cook, 2000, p. 1). With its British roots, and Britain’s 
dominating influence in the Pacific (Moore, 1993, p. 183), Queensland adopted the 
plantation system as the dominant structure for its early sugar industry. Since Britain 
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had abolished the slave trade, plantation owners turned to indentured labourers to 
meet their labour needs, recruiting Pacific islanders at their own expense and 
transporting them to Queensland. It is estimated that in the years 1863 – 1904, some 
62,500 islanders were brought from more than eighty islands, to work on Queensland 
sugar plantations (The Call for Recognition, 1992, p. 73). Since these islanders 
performed all the field work connected with the sugar industry, it is probable that 
without them, “the initial enterprise should not have been forthcoming”, and “very 
few of the old mills and plantations should have seen the light of day” (NBAC/Z303, 
1929). While they played a pivotal role in the success of Queensland’s sugar industry, 
little attention has been paid to the way they were accounted for by the sugar 
entrepreneurs, and for the role of accounting in justifying their employment.  
An acknowledgment of the ability of accounting to legitimise actions (Richardson, 
1987, p. 341) and both to legitimise and sustain “current social, economic and 
political arrangements” (Cooper, 1980, p. 164) has widened interpretations of its role 
in history. Research on CSR at a later time, in a different geographical setting, has 
identified accounting practice as domination, in the tradition of Foucault (Hooks and 
Stewart, 2007). The racial aspects of accounting for slave labour have been 
investigated in the Hawaiian sugar plantations (Fleischman and Tyson, 2000), and in 
the context of accounting’s culpability in the practice of slavery in both the British 
empire and the United States (Oldroyd et al, 2008). Funnell (1998) analysed the use of 
accounting to further the racist policies of the Nazis in the 1930s and 1940s. Further, 
accounting by colonial powers has been implicated in the genocide of indigenous 
people in Canada (Neu, 2000), in the exploitation of imported workers by colonial 
powers (Kim, 2004), and in the imperial domination of colonies (Annisette and Neu, 
2004).  
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While racism is not the primary focus of this paper, it was enshrined in legislation at 
the time of the early Queensland sugar industry, with the employment of Pacific 
islanders justified on economic grounds. This systematic exploitation of an entire 
class of people for the sake of financial gain had profound social effects. Arguably, it 
produced a negative reaction that ultimately contributed to the institution of the White 
Australia policy. 
This study is not a technical history (Hopwood, 1985) or mere narrative that relies on 
“the reproduction of historical materials or chronology of events” (Carnegie and 
Napier, 1996, p. 14). It claims rather to be a genealogy of calculations (Miller and 
Napier, 1993), recognising the powerful role accounting plays in the transmission of 
societal values, acknowledging the fresh perspectives made possible by incorporating  
consideration of past “social and cultural contexts” (Gaffikin, 1998). Consequently, it 
adopts an expanded understanding of what constitutes accounting, moving from a 
narrow conception of bookkeeping to encompass a variety of calculative practices 
(Miller and Napier, 1993; Vollmer, 2003) or “performable technique(s)” (Quattrone, 
2009, p. 85).  
Archival evidence from a variety of sources3 is interpreted sociologically by exploring 
the contribution of both the technical and persuasive aspects of accounting presented 
by CSR to its various audiences (Carruthers and Espeland, 1991). This reflects the 
wider possibilities of an interdisciplinary study of accounting history (O’Hogartaigh 
et al, 2002), focusing on the flexible theoretical boundaries and methodologies of 
accounting and its non-evolutionary nature (Miller et al, 1991; Funnell, 1996).  
The paper first presents a framework for the interpretation of CSR’s accounting, and 
then provides an overview of 19th century Queensland sugar industry politics. 
Following this, CSR’s corporate aspirations and expansion into North Queensland are 
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outlined, including an account of the establishment of its plantation and mill at 
Goondi. The use of cheap Pacific islander labour is presented in the context of CSR’s 
rationale of maintaining healthy dividends to its investors, and of lobbying the 
government to ensure the passing of favourable legislation. The calculative practices 
employed at Goondi are then examined in more detail, and their use in justifying 
decisions about mill operations, including the employment of Pacific islanders, and 
closures, is demonstrated. Finally, conclusions are drawn about the cognitive power of 
both the technical and rhetorical aspects of accounting.   
The technical and persuasive elements of the account 
Eschewing the notion that double-entry bookkeeping is exclusively a technical 
activity, Carruthers and Espeland (1991, p. 31) expound its rhetorical role, which they 
define as its use in convincing an audience of “the legitimacy of business ventures”. 
They assert that in identifying the technical prowess of double-entry bookkeeping and 
its role in the rise of capitalism and its accompanying rationality, Weber, Sombart and 
Schumpeter have neglected the symbolic and legitimising power of accounting 
(Carruthers and Espeland, 1991).  
Double-entry bookkeeping provides information for more rational decision-making. 
By making sense of business activities, it enables the production of an account that is 
a “cognitive device”, framing reality “in a particular way”, justifying decisions, 
convincing an audience of its rationality, and thereby legitimizing an organization’s 
actions (Carruthers and Espeland, 1991, p. 55). Such rational accounts have 
explanatory and motivational power. 
They [the accounts] bolster the rather limited cognitive capacities of 
boundedly rational decision-makers. In doing all these things (quantifying, 
commensurating, recording, evaluating etc), accounts shape the premises 
of decisions (Carruthers, 1995, p. 322). 
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 Appeals to God contained in early examples of double-entry bookkeeping reflected a 
desire for “divine legitimation for a set of mundane activities (Carruthers and 
Espeland, 1991, p. 41), a justification of the morality of the activities reflected by the 
accounts. Not only did double-entry bookkeeping allow entrepreneurs “to invoke a 
body of technical expertise in support of their action” (the technical dimension), but it 
also “engaged with the concept of moral fairness”, since transactions that could be 
accounted for were “defensible” (Maltby, 1997, p. 81). Double-entry bookkeeping 
emphasised prudence and self-discipline as a “moral activity”, with its systematic 
practices representing “a certain kind of moral improvement” (Maltby, 1997, p. 82). 
In fact, the neglect of these attributes provided evidence of weakness of character 
(Carruthers and Espeland, 1991).  
Double-entry bookkeeping thus became valuable for the management of principal-
agent relationships, enabling the provision of an account of operations to a distant 
owner, a feature particularly applicable to corporations with disparate and remote 
investors (Carruthers and Espeland, 1991). Figure 1 presents a framework based on 
these notions. It portrays double-entry bookkeeping as providing the technical 
information on which decisions are made that affect those both internal and external 
to the organisation. These decisions are justified on the basis of this technical 
information, both internally and to the external audience, which variously and over 
time has consisted of God, oneself, principals, agents, customers, investors and the 
public. The account based on technical and factual information is communicated in a 
persuasive way, the justification of decisions taken relying on the “rhetoric of 
numbers” (Carruthers and Espeland, 1991 p. 61).  
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Figure 1. Double-entry bookkeeping, rational decisions and the account 
Thus Carruthers and Espeland (1991) identify the twin dimensions of double-entry 
bookkeeping as inherent, with the technical dimension considered neutral, yet at the 
same time framing the way actions and decisions are taken, and establishing the 
legitimacy of those actions and decisions in a way they define as rhetorical. This 
interpretation of rhetoric can be seen therefore as being persuasive, rather than the 
more sinister interpretation of rhetoric as the obfuscation of “an ideological bias” 
(Moerman and van der Laan, 2007, pp. 354 – 355). Indeed, rhetoric is often perceived 
as a pejorative, “unobjective” or “sneaky and even underhanded” device (Young, 
2003, p. 623). Young (2003, p. 623) adopted a view akin to that of Carruthers and 
Espeland (1991), viewing rhetoric as “a pervasive element within our lives as we 
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argue with and attempt to persuade others and ourselves of the viability, credibility 
and plausibility of our positions, beliefs, problems, solutions and perspectives”. 
Rhetoric is any technique that is used “to make a convincing or persuasive argument” 
(Carruthers and Espeland, 1991, p. 35), its function being to persuade, justify, explain, 
inform, promote, motivate, argue, convince, legitimise, convict or rationalise. 
Accounts are rhetorically effective for all these purposes, because, being presented as 
technical, factual and neutral, they appear logical and rational and are able to alter 
cognitive understanding to achieve the desired attitude or behaviour.  
Double-entry bookkeeping thus facilitates economic rationality, with the reduction of 
calculation to numbers, and often financial numbers, providing a powerful 
justification of actions. In receiving accounts framed in these numerical and financial 
terms, audiences can succumb to their persuasive rhetorical power, believing them to 
be purely technical and rational. This is a dangerous assumption that fails to recognise 
that “all communication, whether verbal, written, numerical, or visual, attempts to 
persuade and can therefore be analysed as rhetoric” (Carruthers and Espeland, 1991, 
p. 62, emphasis added).      
This notion that double-entry bookkeeping contains a “rhetorical agenda” with 
legitimising power (Carruthers and Espeland, 1991, p. 37) has been contested 
(Yamey, 2005; Chiapello, 2007). However, the role of the “balance account” in the 
16th century has been identified as more than simply a technical exercise in 
bookkeeping (Edwards et al, 2009, p. 560), while 18th century Portuguese treasury 
bookkeeping indicates that a solely economic interpretation  did not explain practice 
(Gomes et al, 2008). In a similar vein, the discipline, education and transformation of 
the worker in the late 19th century, particularly of those workers pursuing material 
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rewards, was seen to be coincident with the proliferation and increased complexity of 
accounting information (Bhimani, 1994). 
These observations run counter to the view that accounting is value-neutral, even 
though it has been portrayed as not being critical of behaviour or of the accumulation 
of wealth, but, for example, offering technical calculations for the maximization of 
income (Chambers, 2006).  Suzuki (2003) identified the “constitutive” dimensions of 
accounting, prevalent in managerial accounting, and urged researchers to consider 
their prevalence in financial (or macro) accounting, since accounting is the language 
of business, a powerful symbol and mode of communication.  
A study of accounting’s role in financial crises in Japan revealed a “non-neutral” role 
of accounting in “constructing the image of a particular industry”, while at the same 
time it was presented as nothing more than a technique (Sawabe, 2002, p. 397). 
Rhetoric has been identified as more than “a deliberate effort to fool the simple or 
weak-minded”, but rather a “pervasive element” of life, evident in the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board’s efforts to present their standards as objective (Young, 
2003, p. 623). Accounting standards were identified as containing “numerous efforts 
to persuade readers” to accept the perspective of the standard writers (Young, 2003).  
The insight that double-entry bookkeeping is an interpretive frame, and therefore 
presents an account not just to inform, “but also to convince” (Carruthers and 
Espeland, 1991, p. 35), is consistent with neo-institutional theory, with its emphasis 
on the legitimizing power of social institutions such as accounting (Covaleski and 
Dirsmith, 1995; Carruthers, 1995; Irvine, 2002). The “rhetorical power of accounting” 
was identified as a legitimating influence in the development of the conglomerate 
corporate form prevalent in the US in the 1960s (Espeland and Hirsch, 1990). 
 11
Financial reports, presented as technical and objective reports, also contain rhetorical 
devices (Amernic and Craig, 2000) and have an effect on the economy at large 
(Suzuki, 2003). They frame understanding, reinforce the assumption that decision-
makers are rational (Carruthers, 1995), and they are powerfully symbolic (Espeland 
and Hirsch, 1990; Mouritsen, 1994). This notion challenges the notion that accounting 
is “stable, pre-existing and transportable across borders” (Lohmann, 2009, p. 503), 
since it exposes the political, cultural and power dynamics that have been hidden 
under a technical surface (Carruthers, 1995). Accounting has thus been identified as 
being much more than a narrow technology, making social practices visible, 
calculable, and operationally useful (Miller, 1990). Consequently, it has the power to 
effect change and to contribute to systems of domination and injustice (Neu, 2000; 
Kim, 2004; Annisette and Neu, 2004; Funnell, 1998). Together, the technical and 
rhetorical dimensions of accounting, by framing issues, have the persuasive ability to 
justify actions (Carruthers and Espeland, 1991; Maltby, 1997).  
This will be illustrated in the case of CSR’s use of accounting at its Goondi sugar 
plantation and mill. CSR employed Pacific islanders at that site, and justified their 
employment on rational, economic grounds, not with an overt racial argument but an 
implicit one. Using a persuasive rhetoric of rationality in their communications with 
shareholders, the government, the public and employees at every opportunity, the 
directors relied on accounting calculations to reinforce the importance of a cheap 
labour source and to ensure the economic viability of their operations. 
Sugar industry politics 
To stimulate expansion, the Queensland government passed the Sugar and Coffee 
Regulations Act in 1864 (Frost, 1996, p. 135), releasing extensive tracts of land for 
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cane growing (Barker and Byford, 1988)4. As a result of sugar entrepreneurs’ 
activities, by 1881 sugar production satisfied domestic requirements for the 
Queensland colony and provided sufficient to export, mainly to Victoria and New 
South Wales (Shlomowitz, 1979). The Queensland government, prioritizing the 
economic development of the colony, welcomed the action of these entrepreneurs in 
importing Pacific islander labourers at their own expense (Parnaby, 1964), in what has 
been described as a triumph of “economic expediency” over “racial antipathy” 
(Saunders, 1982, p. 44).  
The recruiting of Pacific islanders began without official approval (Docker, 1970; 
Parnaby, 1964). Indeed, there was always a great deal of opposition to it, from the 
British government, missionaries, the navy and many colonists (Morrison, 1888; 
Buxton, 1980; Irving, 1980)5. Initially these objections appeared to be on the grounds 
that indentured labour was a form of kidnapping or slavery and that workers were 
mistreated (Morrison, 1888; Moore, 1974; Barker and Byford, 1988; The Call for 
Recognition, 1992; Moore, 1993; Evans et al, 1975; Andrew and Cook, 2000). 
However, over the next few decades, the reasons for such opposition became more 
complex and occasioned much more political lobbying and controversy, as public 
opinion moved against the islanders and their employment. This prejudice was fuelled 
by a political push to make Australia “white” (part of the Federation impetus), and by 
pressure from labour unions6 to protect white labour from the competition occasioned 
by islanders, who received substantially lower wages7.  
Specific laws were created first to permit the employment of islanders (Coolie Act 
(Queensland) 1862), then to protect them (Polynesian Labourers Act (Queensland) 
1868)8, to restrict them (Pacific Island Labourers’ Amendment Act (Queensland) 
1884), and finally to deport them (Pacific Island Labourers’ Amendment Act 
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(Queensland) 1885; Pacific Islanders Extension Act (Queensland) 1892; Pacific 
Island Labourers Act 1901). From 1868 to 1912, eight State and thirteen 
Commonwealth Acts were passed on the issue (Gott, 1997). Where the British 
Government held that the Pacific islander labourers’ rights should be equal with those 
of local labour, the Queensland government saw Pacific islanders as “a temporary and 
inferior labour supply” without the rights of Europeans (Parnaby, 1964, p. 153). 
Legislation thus enshrined racist attitudes, resulting in the eventual deportation of 
islanders by 1907 (The Call for Recognition, 1992, p. 73).  
So that this legislation to deport Pacific islanders would not signal the doom of the 
sugar industry, the Central Mill Acts, beginning in 1885, and the Sugar Works 
Guarantee Act (Queensland) 1893 put forward an alternative to dependence on 
coloured labour. These acts provided for an injection of government funds to the 
industry for the establishment of co-operatively owned mills, on the condition that 
only European labour was to be employed (Docker, 1970). Sir Samuel Griffith, the 
premier at the time of the passage of these acts9, had a vision for an egalitarian 
Queensland where men with limited resources could nevertheless farm their own land 
(Moore, 1974). Griffith’s legislation, the Pacific Island Labourers’ Amendment Act 
(Queensland) 1885, which required the cessation of recruitment of islander labour 
from 189010, was an attempt to dispense with two social castes, the rich planters on 
the one hand and the servile and socially excluded Pacific islanders on the other 
(Evans et al, 1975).  
This strategy sent a shock wave to plantation investors, particularly at a time when 
there had been over-speculation in sugar plantations and there was a world slump in 
sugar prices (Bolton, 2003). In addition, the “smallholders”, on whom Griffith was 
relying to carry his new policy, continued to call for a restoration of Pacific islander 
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labour (Bolton, 2003, p. 9). When the sugar industry fell into a depression, the 
McIlwraith government11 appointed a Royal Commission in 1888, to investigate the 
condition of the industry, and whether coloured labour could be dispensed with by 
189012. It later became apparent to Griffith13 (Bolton, 2003, p. 9) that his new policy 
would not succeed without a supply of labour, so he extended recruitment of islanders 
to enable the sugar industry to transition from the plantation model and everything it 
represented to a system of small farms that used white labour (Manning, 1983).  
Two arguments were put forward by plantation owners and managers throughout this 
bitter and protracted debate. First was the belief that white men simply could not 
perform physical labour in the tropics, an argument that reinforced the existing social 
structure and kept non-Europeans in a subservient position, both economically and 
culturally (Andrew and Cook, 2000; Robertson, 1991; Evans et al, 1975). Second was 
the economic argument that the sugar industry would not survive without a reliable 
pool of cheap coloured labour (Evans et al, 1975). On the opposite side, labour unions 
opposed competition from cheaper labour, and racial prejudice emanated from an 
inherent belief in the superiority of white races and the supposed disease and ill-health 
of the islanders (Price, 1939; The Call for Recognition, 1992). Still others identified 
mechanisation as a way of alleviating the political squabbling over the coloured 
labour issue (ASIM/SJ.SJTC, 1894f).  
Public opinion was strong14 and lobbying on the issue was intense. A petition 
presented to the Legislative Assembly of the Colony of Queensland by sugar 
producers and other residents from the Mackay district requested an extension of the 
use of islander labour for an additional five years until 31st December 1895. This 
successful petition also employed a powerful rhetorical, economic argument, 
suggesting that since only 10% of the £700,000 to £800,000 annual expenditure on 
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sugar production went to the islanders, the rest was therefore paid to Europeans 
(NBAC/N126/245, Petition). 
With the cessation of the employment of islanders, the plantation system was 
financially unviable, and the government was promoting the idea of co-operatives. 
Consequently, by 1900 the plantation system had almost completely moved to a new 
co-operative system, whereby the cane lands were democratized (Frost, 1996). The 
Australian population proceeded towards Federation in 1901 on the understanding 
that the White Australia policy would be implemented15, but, on the part of voters in 
northern sugar areas, with a hope that government protection of the industry would 
eventuate (Pagani, 1989).  
These huge changes formed the political backdrop in which CSR operated in the late 
1800s. As it was both a recruiter and employer of Pacific islanders, it was inevitable 
that the company would be caught up in the intensity of the issue.  
CSR’s vision of profit from sugar  
The CSR Company was formed in 1855 with an initial capital of £150,000 to take 
over the assets of the Australasian Sugar Company, whose director Edward Knox, 
became a director of the new company (NBAC/142/3527). Two years later, the 
Victoria Sugar Company was formed, half owned by shareholders in CSR. In addition 
to its other investments in plantations, sugar mills and refineries, the company 
established three sugar plantations in north Queensland in the 1870s at a cost of 
£600,00016. In 1888, when the Victorian company was failing, the two companies 
amalgamated, and CSR Limited was formed (Griggs, 2001; South Pacific Enterprise, 
1956).  
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Key factors that contributed to the company’s sustained success in the sugar industry 
will be shown to be a commitment to maintaining a substantial dividend 
(NBAC/142/3527), a vision for strategic investment in the sugar industry (Docker, 
1970), and a strong emphasis on internal accountability (NBAC/142/1456; 
NBAC/N126/92). In promoting all these commitments, the company employed an 
economic rationale based on accounting numbers, to justify the employment of 
Pacific islander labourers, first in cutting labour costs in order to ensure high profits 
and dividends for its shareholders, secondly, in promoting an economic argument to 
lobby for legislation that would ensure access to indentured labour, and thirdly in 
motivating managers to improve profitability by keeping the cost of labour low. 
A study of the accounts of CSR in the latter part of the 1800s makes it clear that 
agriculture was big business. CSR’s survival, expansion, and domination of the 
Australian sugar industry through extremely turbulent times, both economically and 
politically, indicate a high level of business acumen and sophistication. An editorial in 
the Sugar Journal and Tropical Cultivator (ASIM/SJ.SJTC, 1894a) dated July 15, 
1894, noted CSR’s growth from a single refinery to its “present giant undertaking”, its 
virtual “monopoly” status, and its policy that, “as long as its capital secures a fairly 
remunerative return, the management wisely refrains from attempting to increase its 
profit at the expense of those who work”. The result was that CSR’s balance sheets 
disclosed “handsome profits”, enabling “ample provision to be made for the 
proverbial rainy day” (ASIM/SJ.SJTC, 1894a).  
In the plantation era, CSR enjoyed economies of scale, including the employment of 
indentured labour gangs (Shlomowitz, 1979). This resulted in great success, with an 
initial boost to profits and a steady dividend flow to shareholders, as portrayed in 
Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. CSR Dividends 1888 – 1898 
(Source: based on data from NBAC/142/3527) 
While profits decreased and levelled out from the mid 1890s onward, the company 
pursued an aggressive policy of increasing dividends from 6% in 1887 to 10% in 
1891, and maintained them at that level through the rest of the 1890s 
(NBAC/142/3527). A dividend equalization reserve was established in 1889 with an 
initial transfer of £30,000, was increased to £165,000 in 1894, and was maintained at 
that level into the twentieth century, thus assuring shareholders of a constant stream of 
income even if profits decreased. The company strategically dealt with local issues 
and with the internationally disastrous years 1885 – 1891, when the world price of 
sugar fell by a third and remained low for the next three decades (Shlomowitz, 1979). 
The directors’ report for the half year ended 31st March 1889 also highlighted 
“disastrous” results, and indicated the increasingly complex industry issues that the 
company had to deal with (NBAC/142/3527, 31st March 1889).  
The directors used the company’s half yearly reports through the 1890s constantly to 
justify, convince and legitimise their employment of Pacific islander labour, referring 
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consistently to the shifting political landscape and its implications for their profitable 
operations. They highlighted the Queensland government’s legislation to prevent the 
use of islander labour, to abolish the plantation system and to employ white labour, 
and the possible impacts on their business decisions. Throughout these uncertain 
years, directors made strategic decisions about the company’s operations in order to 
extract the greatest profit possible and to preserve the invested capital. This was 
evident in the directors’ business acumen (Shlomowitz, 1979) and in their stated 
commitment, expressed in annual reports, to maintaining profitable operations and 
healthy dividends (NBAC/142/3527). The employment of Pacific islander labour was 
a crucial factor to be considered.  
When it became apparent that public sentiment and legislation was moving against the 
employment of Pacific islanders and there was “no chance of the labour difficulty” 
being resolved, the Directors considered moving one of their sugar mills from 
Queensland to Fiji in 1891 (NBAC/142/3527, 31st March 1890). With the likelihood 
that the supply of cheap coloured labour in Queensland would disappear if new 
legislation was passed that restricted the recruitment and employment of indentured 
labourers, the ready availability of cheap coloured labour in Fiji was an attractive 
prospect, especially since CSR and other sugar producers were convinced that sugar 
plantations could not be run with anything but coloured labour (NBAC/142/3527, 31st 
March 1890).  
When the Queensland Government introduced its scheme to allow the acquisition of 
sugar plantations by co-operatives of settlers, the CSR directors were concerned to 
sell their Victoria Mill for a price that would return to them “the sum to which it has 
been written down” (NBAC/142/3527, 30th September 1891). Later, when the date for 
the eviction of the Pacific islanders was extended, the directors reported that they 
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were arranging to retain in Queensland the plant they had proposed to take to Fiji 
(NBAC/142/3527, 31st March 1892). The move to Fiji of at least some of CSR’s 
operations, however, was inevitable, with the directors reporting in 1893 that they 
were gradually disposing of their Queensland cultivated lands. At that point they had 
disposed of 5,514 acres, and reported that work on the Fijian plantation was “going on 
well” (NBAC/142/3527, 31st March 1893). 
In this ongoing saga, the directors’ rhetoric continued, as they constantly justified and, 
on economic grounds, rationalised the continuation of the practice of indentured 
islander labour. They reported in 1895 that the Queensland Government’s scheme of 
central mills to be worked only by white labourers would inhibit the production of 
sugar at a cost that would make it competitive in the markets of Europe and America 
(NBAC/142/3527, 31st March 1895). The following year the Directors reported again 
on the difficulty of keeping the cost of sugar production competitive, expressing 
resistance to the idea of recruiting coloured labourers from other places such as India, 
to the point of facing “the destruction of the industry” (NBAC/142/3527, 31st March 
1896). 
This use of the Annual Report to justify using islander labour, and to frame the debate 
about the Queensland Government’s sugar legislation continued. The directors stated 
in 1896 that “it is evident that there is now no hope of preventing the sacrifice of this 
great agricultural and manufacturing interest, which has been singled out for 
destruction, while other less important industries remain largely protected” 
(NBAC/142/3527, 30th September 1896). Profitability was always the primary 
concern. The directors reported in 1897 that they were “free to close the mills when 
the working of these ceases to be profitable” (NBAC/142/3527, 30th September 1897). 
At this point they anticipated having to write off about ₤450,000, which they would 
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do “without trenching upon the paid-up capital” (NBAC/142/3527, 30th September 
1897). In referring to the Queensland Government’s appointment of a Commission of 
inquiry into the sugar industry depression, a report expressed confidence that “vested 
interests” would ensure the continuation of the use of Pacific islander labour 
(NBAC/142/3527, 31st March 1899). Nevertheless, directors assured shareholders that 
the company’s labour force would be brought up to “full strength” in anticipation of a 
prohibition on the importation of coloured labour (NBAC/142/3527, 31st March 
1899).  
CSR’s north Queensland operations provide a specific example of the vision of 
directors in seizing a new profit-making opportunity, of their business acumen in 
directing its operations, and of their use of persuasive rhetoric in Annual Reports in 
putting forward an economic argument to justify the employment of cheap islander 
labour. By a special Act of Parliament, CSR was given permission to take up “great 
areas of land in various places”, on the under-taking that it would spend “£200,000 
within five years on the clearing and cultivation of that land and erection of plant” 
(Docker, 1970, p. 99). One site chosen for this endeavour was a 5,000 acre parcel of 
land on the Johnstone River in North Queensland. The CSR Board authorised its 
acquisition in 1882, and Charles Edward Adams was sent there to “set things going at 
Goondi”17 (Robertson, 1991, p. 3).  
The Goondi mill, 8 miles upstream from Geraldton (now Innisfail), was one of three 
mills operated by CSR in north Queensland. The decision to erect a mill at Goondi 
was made because of the closure of other mills in the district, with the result that in 
1884, CSR approved the dismantling and transportation of the Southgate sugar mill 
on the Clarence River (northern New South Wales) to the North Johnstone river 
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(Robertson, 1991, p. 5). No less was expected of the Goondi plantation and mill than 
was expected of any of CSR’s other business operations: profit.  
CSR’s directors, in particular, E W Knox18, paid meticulous attention to every detail 
of its operation. Knox’s voluminous correspondence with C E Forster, the manager of 
the Goondi mill in the late 1880s, illustrates his thorough knowledge of every aspect 
of the sugar industry, his emphasis on profitability, and the high degree of 
accountability he required of the mill manager, C E Forster, for every aspect of 
Goondi’s performance (NBAC/142/1456; NBAC/N126/92; NBAC/N126/2). This 
included the quantity and quality of cane produced, the cost at which it was produced, 
and its performance relative to other north Queensland mills. Accounting was a vital 
part of this mechanism of accountability, which was developed in the context of the 
unique political and economic situation in which the company operated, particularly 
in relation to the employment of indentured labourers from the Pacific islands.  The 
emphasis in this extensive and detailed correspondence was always on maintaining or 
improving profitability, motivating the Goondi manager, and justifying decisions 
taken on economic grounds. The continuation of islander labour was promoted as an 
essential element of this economic rationale.  
Indentured workers at Goondi 
From the time of CSR’s arrival at the Johnstone River in 1882, the company was 
actively involved in recruiting islanders19, initially chartering ships, and then 
purchasing a ship that made regular trips to the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands 
(Robertson, 1991, p. 9). Government agents travelled with the ship and, on at least 
one occasion, were seen as having a negative effect on recruiting capabilities 
(NBAC/142/1456, pp. 109 – 110). Pacific islanders were not the only non-white 
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labourers employed by CSR on its sugar plantations. In 1888, the workforce at 
Goondi comprised 175 Europeans, 50 Chinese, 70 Aborigines, 325 Melanesians (The 
Call for Recognition, 1992, p. 81) and 50 others, including Malays and Javanese 
(Evans et al, 1975, p. 179).  
All workers performed clearly defined duties, “allocated on a combination of what 
was socially acceptable and what construed the economic running of the Plantation” 
(Robertson, 1991, p. 8). For Europeans, this meant positions as “engineers, store 
keepers, blacksmiths, skilled workers in the mill and as overseers and ploughmen in 
the fields”, with “gangers” supervising up to 30 “Kanaka boys” (Robertson, 1991, p. 
8). The use of cheap coloured labour was promoted as essential to the profitable 
running of the operation. Figure 3 outlines the line of command, from coloured field 
labourers at the bottom of the hierarchy, to the planter at the top. CSR offered “high 
wages and good quarters in an attempt to attract the most highly-qualified and 
temperamentally-suited men” (Saunders, 1982, p. 61)20, and estates were laid out in a 
way that enhanced racial and hierarchical divisions, with technical and managerial 
staff named “officers” and appropriately accommodated away from the workers” 
(Saunders, 1982, p. 62).   
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Figure 3. Plantation Structure: Status and Authority 
(Saunders, 1982, p. 62)21 
It was estimated that the cost of bringing a labourer from a South Pacific island, a 
distance of 900 miles, was £25 - £35 per head (ASIM/SJ.SJTC, 1894c), and that it 
cost approximately £26 per year to keep each one. This was made up of wages set at 
£6 per year as well as rations of food, blankets, clothing, provisions, housing and 
medical treatment, according to the regulations of the Polynesian Labourers Act 
(Queensland) of 1868 (Robertson, 1991). Even these simple arrangements caused 
controversy. Not all planters were happy with the “Kanaka gardens”, with one 
correspondent to the Editor of The Sugar Journal and Tropical Cultivator 
(ASIM/SJ.SJTC, 1894d, p. 172) asserting that “if we wish to see the next generation 
in this colony remain our own color, we ought certainly to now take decisive steps to 
prevent the alienation of our land to any colored races”.  
In spite of these sentiments being held in certain quarters, the recruitment of Pacific 
islander labour represented a significant investment for CSR, and it was in their 
interests to provide workers with the kind of provisions, accommodation and medical 
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care that ensured their good health and ability to perform the work for which they had 
been brought to the plantation. Consequently, at Goondi, Pacific islanders, together 
with other non-white labourers, appear to have been well housed and cared for, 
according to correspondence from CSR’s head office in Sydney to Goondi Mill 
(NBAC/N126/2, 2nd September 1891).  
A constant supply of islander labour, however, was not able to continue, as a result of 
the restrictive legislation already mentioned. As opinion turned against the 
employment of coloured labourers, CSR found it more difficult to ensure a steady 
stream of workers to work in the fields and prepare the cane for the crushing season at 
the Goondi Mill. Since the economic operation of mills was of primary importance, 
the Board, well aware of public sentiment on the issue, considered various other 
strategies to overcome these difficulties in its north Queensland operations. In all 
decision-making, profitability and economic considerations, based on accounting 
information, dominated the agenda and were used to explain and justify actions 
adopted. 
These included the closure of the Victoria mill and its relocation to Fiji, and a 
consideration about whether fieldwork should be attempted with European labour 
(NBAC/N126/92 30th January 1891). Another possibility was the re-engagement of 
islanders whose time was “expiring” at a higher wage rate, provided the increased rate 
could be justified and the “working expenses” of the plantation would not be “unduly 
increased” (NBAC/N126/92, 4th February 1891). In addition, the possibility of hiring 
Javanese labourers was given consideration, since the company was “inclined to think 
that they [the Government] are beginning to feel sorry for the sugar industry” 
(NBAC/N126/2, 29th September 1891), and Java, in 1891, had not yet been ruled out 
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by the Government as a potential recruiting ground for sugar workers 
(NBAC/N126/92, 30th January 1891). 
During this time, Pacific islander labourers became difficult to procure, their wages 
increased (ASIM/SJ.SJTC, 1894b, p. 106; ASIM/SJ.SJTC 1894e, pp. 82 – 83), and 
the Queensland government introduced a tax on Melanesians arriving in Queensland 
(Shlomowitz, 1982, p. 51).  In an attempt to curb increases in wages for islanders, the 
Planters’ Association, in 1889, had recommended that such wages be limited to £6 per 
annum, with an additional £3 to be paid only if they were “sound working boys of 
good physique” (NBAC/N126/245, 30th April 1889). Further, it was recommended 
that “overtime Kanakas” (those who had already completed a term of engagement) be 
employed at a uniform rate of £12 per annum, or £15 where their return passage was 
already paid. These recommendations were made “chiefly to avoid the irritation 
believed to have been caused in the minds of White Laborers by fluctuating and often 
high rates being offered Kanakas and thus even affecting their own rates” 
(NBAC/N126/245, 30th April 1889).  
The decision by the CSR Board to close its Victoria Mill in north Queensland, and 
relocate it to Fiji, was made in an attempt to manage labour issues (NBAC/142/3527, 
31st March 1891). Once again, an economic rationale was used to justify this decision 
and to provide a convincing argument based on profitability grounds. It was believed 
that it would be more profitable to operate there, given Fiji’s ready supply of cheap 
labour and the “satisfactory arrangements” being made with the Government of Fiji 
(NBAC/142/3527, 31st March 1890). Always looking for opportunities to invest 
profitably, and to curtail potential losses, the directors at this time decided to dispose 
of “part of the arable land” at the Mackay mill to farmers, in order to find “some 
partial solution of the labour difficulty”, while at the Goondi mill, they were hopeful 
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that they could “procure sufficient coloured labour to enable this to be worked for 
some years to come” (NBAC/142/3527, 31st March 1891).  
With these kinds of difficulties in acquiring cheap labour, the Goondi Mill manager, 
Mr Forster, as a member of the Planters Association, promoted CSR’s economic 
argument to the government and the general public. He became involved, for a time, 
in a lobbying attempt to extend the 1885 Act so that Pacific islander labourers could 
be employed for an additional five years, until 31st December 1895. The necessity of a 
continuing supply of cheap islander labour was promoted as essential in maintaining 
the profitability of sugar operations, and by extension, as essential to Queensland’s 
economic progress. Mr Forster attended an initial meeting of the Planters Association 
in Townsville on 29th April 1889 where it was decided to send delegates to Brisbane 
during the discussion of the report on the Sugar Commission, “with the object of 
assisting Members favourable to an extension of Kanaka Labor” (NBAC/N126/245). 
In order to fund this “agitation”, a levy of 1/- per acre was made on “all growers of 
cane throughout the Colony” (NBAC/N126/245). In 1989 CSR contributed an amount 
of £336/7/-, based on 6,727 acres at Goondi (NBAC/N126/245, 9th July 1889).  
Further suggestions for addressing the labour problems caused by the “injustice of 
prohibiting the introduction of Kanakas” (NBAC/N126/245, 4th March 1890) were put 
forward. While the claim to justice was made, it promoted an economic rationality 
argument to convince politicians and the public, and was centred on the necessity of 
cheap labour in order to ensure sugar profits. In spite of the trade unions’ opposition 
to “the introduction of cheap Europeans” (NBAC/N126/245, 21st July 1890), these 
included the introduction of Italians, described as “the lesser of two evils” 
(NBAC/N126/245, 21st July 1890). Another suggestion was to import Japanese 
workers, provided “no objection were raised” (NBAC/N126/245, 14th October 1889). 
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Even though the Act was extended, permitting the employment of islander labourers 
until 1895, further agitation was considered “hopeless”, with further expenditure on 
lobbying “useless” (NBAC/N126/245, 15th May 1890; NBAC/N126/245, 16th 
December 1890). Although an economic rhetoric was employed throughout this 
process to justify the continuation of islander employment, the attempt to portray an 
image of the industry as requiring free access to cheap labour was eventually a failure 
(Sawabe, 2002).  
The restriction of the duties Pacific islanders were allowed to perform according to 
the 1884 Act was a frustration to plantation and mill owners. It highlighted the 
shifting tide of public opinion, stirred up by union agitation, and the failure of the 
rhetoric of economic rationality to convince the public, which had broader societal 
concerns about the practice of employing islanders. In 1890, CSR was charged with 
breaching the Pacific Islanders Act, by using islanders to perform tasks that did not 
come within the classification of “field work” (NBAC/N126/247, 25th July 1890). The 
islanders had apparently been involved in the unloading of a vessel, but legal advice 
provided by G A Roberts & Leu, Solicitors of Townsville, to the Manager of the 
Goondi Mill (NBAC/N126/245, 15th July 1890) was unclear, since there was some 
doubt about the actual nature of the work done. The Manager was advised to provide 
evidence at the hearing “to prove the islanders had nothing to do with the steam-
winch, and were not employed discharging the vessel”. The company was 
unsuccessful in pressing its case, and was fined the sum of £1, and ordered to pay 
£2/2/- costs (NBAC/N126/247, 25th July 1890). Correspondence from Edward Knox, 
General Manager of CSR, to Mr Forster advised “it is no use attempting to have the 
decision of the Bench reversed … we had better drop the appeal, public sympathy 
being against us” (NBAC/142/1457, 7th August 1890, pp. 205 - 206).  
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At this time pressure on labour was not just coming from the Government in the form 
of legislation, but from the trade unions. The economic argument was losing traction, 
and was not convincing enough in the face of widespread public opposition to the 
employment of islander labourers. In Townsville22, labourers formed an organisation 
and garnered considerable support in order to challenge “the authority of the snug 
little junta of businessmen who ran the town hall” (Bolton, 2003, p. 10). The 
Australian Labor Federation was alert to practices at Goondi, and actively pursued 
CSR. One issue was the splitting of firewood, which CSR maintained was “field 
work”, but the Federation argued did not come within the Act. Edward Y Lowry, of 
the Federation’s Townsville District Council, communicated by letter with Mr Forster 
on 1st December 1890 about this matter, requiring that he “utilize some other class of 
labor for above purposes so as to avoid unnecessary friction” (NBAC/N126/247). 
A representative of the Planters’ Association expressed surprise that CSR should be 
“the first to be assaulted by the labour unions” as they employed “proportionately … a 
larger amount of Europeans than on any other plantation” and were “generally 
acknowledged to treat them very well” (NBAC/N126/245, 9th December 1890). He 
advised that “planters should shew a solid front and that an assault against one is 
equally against all” and advised that it would be well “to make a test case”. CSR 
obviously shared this view, as a further letter from the Australian Labour Federation’s 
Townsville District Council, dated 15th December 1890, expressed disapproval of Mr 
Forster’s “actions and treatment of our worthy delegate”, trusting that “time will 
bridge the gulf of inequality which now separates master from man ….” 
(NBAC/N126/247). 
Even though Edward Knox, writing on 16th December 1890, advised Mr Forster that 
“we have not any intention of obeying the ‘order’ of the Labor Federation about not 
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employing Kanakas for cutting firewood” (NBAC/142/1457), it became increasingly 
obvious that the economic rhetoric was failing to convince and persuade, and that the 
institutional goal posts were shifting markedly during the 1890s. Through this decade, 
Pacific islander labour was on the way out, the labour movement was growing in 
influence, and Australia was moving towards Federation and a White Australia 
policy. CSR had to deal with these changing labour patterns and re-orient its 
operations to accommodate these changes if it was to survive. The company had a 
history of “reading” the economic and political landscape and tailoring its practices to 
suit expectations and maximise its profits, and this understanding would no doubt 
have figured largely in CSR’s decision to relocate its mill to Fiji. Earlier, when CSR 
transferred the bulk of its operations to Queensland, 
… it immediately followed what was economically the most viable line 
and became the largest estate owner and importer of Kanakas in the 
colony, watching with jaundiced eye the efforts of a few small-holders to 
establish themselves … then quite suddenly the central factory idea 
reappeared in a new light – as a possible answer to the growing labour 
problem – and the company underwent a swift change of heart and 
reversed its attitude to the selector altogether (Docker, 1970, pp 210 – 
211).  
CSR’s response to these changes represented a changing economic justification for its 
actions, informed by the accounting calculations generated at its various business 
operations and head office. With CSR’s policy of maintaining the payment of a 
healthy dividend to investors, profitability was of primary importance, so decisions 
were justified by technical information about the cost of operations, particularly the 
cost of labour, presented as an economically rational account.  While the same 
economic considerations existed, due to shifting public opinion, the company was 
forced to abandon its attempts to persuade the public that the employment of 
indentured labour was justified.  
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Calculations at Goondi 
CSR relied on a sophisticated accounting system in order to ensure the achievement 
of a profit acceptable to its investors23. In order to achieve this, a demanding system 
of accountability was established for those who worked in management positions in 
the company, including mill managers such as Mr Forster at Goondi. The annual 
review of managers’ salaries took into account their performance in the preceding 
year, in terms of the cost of cane produced and the quality of the product, with very 
specific directions about their salaries emanating from CSR’s Sydney office24: 
Mr. Stobo. His salary has been increased to £325 per annum as per 1 
January.  
Mr. Carnie. All things considered I think this officer is very well 
remunerated with his present salary. 
Mr. Mighell. To draw £200 per an. from 1 July provided, of course, that 
his work is satisfactory in the meantime (NBAC/N126/92, 28th January 
1891). 
Part of the Goondi mill manager’s responsibilities included accounting, with a 
bookkeeper employed for that purpose. The intense and detailed supervision 
emanating from CSR’s Sydney office reflected an emphasis on the moral rectitude of 
good account keeping (Carruthers and Espeland, 1991), with a scrupulous attention to 
detail and accuracy. The Goondi bookkeeper’s salary increase was under threat when 
the 1890 accounts were apparently kept in an “unexpectedly careless and neglectful 
manner” (NBAC/N126/92, 5th March 1891). Specifically, discrepancies were noted 
between the Cash account and the “four weekly statement of Wages paid to 
Europeans and Chinese, the erroneous Polynesian return Statement … and other 
inaccuracies”  (NBAC/N126/92, 2nd April 1891). Strict accounts were to be kept of 
the wages earned by “Europeans and labour” (NBAC/N126/2, 13th July 1891), and 
every care was to be taken to account for sugar at every stage of the production 
process (NBAC/N126/2, 18th June 1891). The dialogue was dominated by technical 
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and rational accounting numbers, framed by the necessity to maintain or improve 
profitability. 
CSR’s objective was to increase the yield of the cane-growing lands, and to increase 
both the quality and quantity of sugar from the mill, and there was no area outside the 
scrutiny of its head office or immune to counting and measuring, even to the usage 
and recording of manures used in fertilising and the digging of holes in which to plant 
cane: 
… By this mail you will receive 1 book and 12 sheets for the purposes of 
a daily journal on manures and 1 book and 8 sheets for half yearly reports 
on manures as well as 40 forms for statements on … actual yield of the 
cane crops. The books on Manures should be regularly kept and twice a 
year copies of the records therein sent to Sydney on the loose forms … 
(NBAC/N126/2, 7th January 1891). 
With regard to digging large holes for cane, I can only say that your 
Kanakas remove just half the quantity of earth that a coolie does on 
similar soil in Fiji. You state that it takes £2 – or 12 Kanakas – per acre, 
say for 2000 holes, or 166 holes per man. 
Goondi  166 holes 20” X 10” X 10” = 7.1 cubic yards 
Fiji task  120 holes 24” X 20” X 12” = 14.8 cubic yards 
In my previous estimate I calculated one acre to contain 1782 holes … 
and 80 to be dug per day, or under 12 cubic yards per man = £3/13/4 p.a.  
(NBAC/N126/2 14th October 1891). 
… I am under the impression that we are much behind other sugar 
growing countries in the planting, and that we should take much more 
care with this operation than hitherto (NBAC/N126/2, 22nd September 
1891). 
These detailed figures were not an end in themselves, but were part of a data-
gathering exercise designed to inform decision-making and justify subsequent actions. 
They provided an account designed to convince managers of the necessity of 
controlling expenditure, to compare performance between mills, and to justify 
employment practices or mill closures. 
Fleischman and Tyson (2000, p. 25) observed in a study of Hawaiian sugar 
plantations, that in the case of coloured labourers, there were no records on the 
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performance of individual workers, i.e. “efficiency data were not necessary because 
they were irrelevant from the racial control perspective”. They drew attention to the 
fact that “wage rates were differentiated according to ethnicity”, and that “accounting 
served managerial elites by reinforcing these policies” (Fleischman and Tyson, 2000, 
p. 28). There is no doubt this was the case in the Queensland sugar industry, 
legislation having set the parameters for the use of Pacific islander labour, and 
therefore, indirectly, the parameters for accounting for such labour.  
Certainly, as highlighted above, the names even of unskilled white labourers were 
listed in the Labour Register (NBAC/N74/50-51), and yet Pacific islander labourers 
were not distinguished between, but classed simply as a group, as demonstrated in 
Appendix 1.  It was when the wages they could command began to increase that 
distinctions were made within that class of labourers about those who were re-
engaging or not, but it was on the basis of the cost-effectiveness of their group that 
decisions were made and justified. This interpretation is consistent with Burrows’ 
(2002) response to Fleischman and Tyson (2000), in which he asserts that it was 
efficiency rather than race that motivated the accounting policies in Hawaiian sugar 
plantations. In this Queensland context, while racism is implicit in CSR’s business 
practices, accounting reflects economic motivations, and it is the economic argument 
that transcends all other considerations.  
Coloured labour was recorded separately from European labour, and ethnic groups 
were divided further into Coolie, Chinese, Fijian, Javanese, Japanese, Cingalese and 
Kanaka (NBAC/142/3566). It was held to be important that these categories be kept 
separate, as designated in the Mill accounts that were prepared each year25, and 
emphasized in the following correspondence from E W Knox in Sydney to C E 
Forster Esq at Goondi Mill: 
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… With reference to your statement of Polynesians on Plantation on 31st 
Dec as shown on your Yearly return … We want the number of men of 
each ship with the date when their agreement expires, who are on the 
plantation on the 31st Dec 1890. It is impossible to work from your return 
as in 1889 you shew ex Eliza Mary 86 Kanakas while in 1890 you show 
101 whose time expired on Aug 21st 1890 ... Please send a correct 
statement shewing the actual number on the Plantation, by return post as 
we cannot make up the accounts until this is done (NBAC/N126/2, 11th 
February 1891).  
These detailed labour records were essential in the decision making process 
about whether the Victoria Mill was viable, or whether it was to be closed 
(NBAC/N126/2, 28th January 1891). Expenditure on the various ethnicities of 
labour was recorded separately (NBAC/N126/2, 21st January 1891), with even 
the details of rations split between the various categories (NBAC/142/1456, 4th 
March 1890, p. 445). The rationale for this information was to enable 
comparisons to be made between mills, for decision making purposes, and to 
justify and convince the CSR audience that those decisions were rational. 
The colored labor should be shown after the European, in the same 
manner as in your last slack season’s estimate. This return is wanted for 
comparison of the work done at the various Mills, and its preparation will 
enable you to estimate with greater accuracy the total expenditure which 
you wish to be authorized (NBAC/N126/2, 11th November 1891). 
With a goal of operating the mill as profitably as possible, to CSR directors, these 
detailed classifications were useful to ascertain and therefore track the cost of various 
tasks, depending on how labour-intensive they were, e.g. clearing, maintenance, and 
the cost of cutting cane. Correspondence from E W Knox to the Goondi manager, C E 
Forster, presented a clear but persuasive message that the company required costs to 
be low enough to ensure a “fair return”, bearing in mind the “precarious” nature of the 
operations at Goondi (NBAC/142/1457, 16th December 1890, E W Knox to C E 
Forster). The Goondi manager would have been in no doubt that he was being 
compared with and in competition with CSR’s other North Queensland operations, 
and that the comparison was made on economic grounds.   
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The cost of cutting the cane is certainly very high at Goondi. Mr Pope’s 
explanation of this is noted but at Homebush where they have also very 
light crops and fully 3 miles of horse-traction the cost is 3 ½ d per ton 
lower (NBAC/N126/2, 22nd September 1891, E W Knox to C E Forster). 
The rhetoric of these detailed figures was clearly motivational. Strict records were 
kept of every aspect of production, and stringent measures were to be employed in 
increasing the yield of the plantation, and in controlling expenditure26, in order to 
produce sugar at the lowest cost possible: 
“The figure you give as the average yield of the whole plantation – 11 
tons per acre – is truly a miserable return from such good land as that at 
Goondi … the yield should go up every year henceforward” 
(NBAC/N126/2, 16th December 1891, E W Knox to C E Forster at 
Goondi Mill). 
Keeping these costs low contributed to the overall result of the mill, i.e. the cost of 
producing the sugar. Mr Forster was informed by a letter dated 17th March 1890 that 
“your sugar was, after all, produced at a moderate price, chiefly in consequence of the 
cost of kanaka labour being very low and through the percentage of workers being 
high” (NBAC/142/1457).  
Comparisons were frequently made between the three north Queensland mills, as 
correspondence from E W Knox to C E Forster indicates. Maintenance expenditure 
and mill wages were two items singled out for attention (NBAC/142/1456, 20th May 
1889, pp. 34 – 35; NBAC/N126/92, 23rd September 1891; NBAC/142/1456, 20th May 
1889, pp. 34 – 35; NBAC/142/1456, 1st May 1899, p. 9). Table 1 illustrates the kind 
of document that was prepared for the information of the mill managers, in order to 
inform them of the cost of their operations, and to alert them to the importance of 
operating in as cost-effective a manner as possible. This economic rhetoric was the 
underlying theme of all these records, and of all the correspondence between the 
Goondi mill manager and CSR’s head office. 
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 Homebush Victoria Goondi 
 £ s d £ s d £ s d
Material for 
maintenance 
1948 16 9 1968 4 9 2599 4 10
Material for 
Manufacture 
401 3 7 581 8 11 435 5 3
Sundries 681 4 2 626 9 10 650 7 11
Wages 1178 5 8 1586 2 6 1588 17 -
Fuel *  179 13 8 135 7 -
 4209 10 2 4941 19 8 5409 2 -
 * £42 included in 
Material 
£202 in steamers and 
parts 
£78 on steamers and 
parts 
 
Table 1. Maintenance of Plant and General Charges Comparative Statement 
(NBAC/142/1456, 15th March 1890, p. 477, E W Knox to C E Forster) 
The capturing of this kind of information about the profitability of operations alerted 
CSR’s internal audience of mill managers to the prevailing economic rationale 
underlying board decisions about wages and potential mill closures, particularly in the 
comparisons drawn between mills. It was a persuasive rhetoric designed to achieve 
desired behaviour and justify decisions taken. A letter from E W Knox at Sydney to 
the Goondi manager dated 1st April 1890 (NBAC/142/1457) stated that Victoria 
Mill’s “greater working expenses” indicated “the advisability of removing Victoria 
Mill and not Homebush, if we decide on employing the plant of one of the 
Queensland mills in Fiji”. Directors needed to know what cheap labour was available, 
in order to make such a decision, and were able to use accounting numbers to justify 
those decisions. The following projection of the availability of coloured labour crucial 
to the running of the mill, shown in Table 2 illustrates the kind of planning that was 
undertaken at that level:   
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1st Jany ’91 546 Kanakas
To leave Jany/Sept 88
 458
To arrive Sept 400 Javanese 
To leave Oct/Dec176 Kanakas 
224
 682
Average available for ’91 crop say 700 
1st Jany ’92 682
To leave Jany/June 97
Available for ’92 crop 585
1st Jany ’93 585
To leave – Jany/July 168
Available for ’93 crop 417
To leave Dec ‘93 17
 400 Javanese who if engaged by 31st 
Dec ’94 could take the crop off that 
year 
 
Table 2. Estimates of Coloured Labour at Goondi 1891 to 1893. 
(NBAC/N126/92, 30th January 1891) 
CSR recognized the necessity of working within the constraints of public opinion. 
New situations required changes and opened up new possibilities for profitable 
operations, with CSR’s strict and prescribed accounting system providing economic 
input for decision making at Board level and for the justification of those decisions to 
investors. The accounting system captured the precise cost of every aspect of the 
production process, including the employment of labour, to compare the various costs 
from year to year within and between mills. Accounting systems thus produced 
technical information which CSR presented as a persuasive account to internal and 
external audiences.  
Conclusions 
CSR, as a sugar producer in north Queensland in the late 1800s, employed and 
accounted for indentured Pacific islanders in a way that reflected current employment 
politics, the economic agenda of the government and public opinion about the 
practicality and morality of these practices. The CSR board and the Goondi manager 
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operated within the possibilities and constraints of this environment, strategically 
apprehending and managing investment opportunities to achieve a profit that would 
enable the payment of a high dividend to investors. To this end, the employment of 
Pacific islanders was explained entirely on rational, economic grounds, as illustrated 
by the strict categorisation of expenditure on white and coloured labour, and the use 
of this information to justify decisions about labour employment and mill closure.  
The necessity of making a profit provided the persuasively rational rhetoric used to 
make and justify the board’s decisions. As portrayed in Figure 4, accounting, as a set 
of calculations, was an integral part of this process. Manifesting both technical and 
rhetorical dimensions, it provided an account of the company’s operations. Internally 
it enabled the technical calculation of costs and profits for board decisions, and the 
justification of those decisions on the basis of their economic rationality, to the 
Goondi manager and employees. Those calculations were then presented to CSR’s 
external audience, to persuade the government, to justify decisions to the general 
public, and to convince shareholders that everything possible was being done to 
maximise their returns.   
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Goondi Plantation and Mill
(INTERNAL AUDIENCE)
Technical Rhetorical
EXTERNAL  AUDIENCE
Government
General Public
CSR Shareholders
(external audience)
CSR Board of Directors
The account
Accounting calculations
 
Figure 4. Goondi accounting for making and justifying decisions 
What is the value of providing this historical account? First, the paper contributes to 
the accounting history literature by describing and analysing the way accounting was 
actually practised on a day-to-day basis in a specific place, at a specific time 
(Carnegie and Napier, 1996). Secondly, by using a sociological perspective to frame 
accounting at CSR’s Goondi plantation and mill, the paper illustrates the value of 
combining questions of “what” and “how”, with “why” and “how did we get into this 
state?” (Funnell, 1996, p. 59).  It focuses not merely on what accounting was done 
and how records were kept and used, but why they were kept and the way they were 
used. In this case, they were used to enable the persuasive promotion and justification 
of the employment of a labour under-class. Thirdly, the study of accounting as it is 
practised in specific situations not only casts light on the practices taken for granted in 
the past but also alerts us to the need to challenge and critique accounting practices 
taken for granted today (Carnegie and Napier, 1996). If, as Miller et al (1991, p. 401) 
suggested, “an unravelling of the relations of power within which accounting is 
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embedded, and which in turn it has helped to fabricate, is a worthwhile objective in its 
own right”, then we, as accounting researchers, have the opportunity to look back and 
reflect on our history, however challenging it may be, in the light of current events in 
which accounting is implicated.   
By using a particular framework, this paper provides insights not possible in the mere 
recitation of historical facts, but at the same time, neglects other possible 
interpretations. Perspectives that could prove fruitful for further research on 
Queensland’s use of indentured Pacific islanders, for example, could include a study 
conducted at sugar mill operated by a different company, or the use of an interpretive 
framework based on racism, domination and control in the Foucauldian tradition, or 
the globalising influences of colonialism. Further research could be conducted in 
different historic sites to investigate the contributions both the technical and 
persuasive rhetorical dimensions of accounting make to the fulfilment of corporate 
aspirations.   
The story of CSR, its plantation and mill at Goondi, and the way labour was 
accounted for is historically interesting, but what is more interesting and challenging 
is to reflect on the way in which economic arguments were mounted, based on 
accounting and notions of profitability, to justify and legitimise a legalised form of 
exploitation. As accounting historians, we are well placed to recognize the power of 
accounting in perpetuating injustices and mobilizing economic arguments, which are 
later recognised as inappropriate or unjust. What social institutions are we, as 
accountants, accepting without question and perpetuating today? 
Postscript. 
In 1994, the Australian Federal Government recognized South Sea 
Islanders as a community. On 9 September 2000, 400 Australian South 
Sea Islanders took part in a recognition ceremony at Queensland 
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Parliament House. The Queensland government Recognition Statement 
acknowledged “past injustices, discrimination, social disadvantage and 
racial prejudice”, and stated that “the Queensland Government hereby 
formally recognises Australian South Sea Islanders as a distinct cultural 
group” (Brändle, 2001, p. 38).  
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Appendix 1. Goondi Mill Labour Monthly Balances 
(Source: NBAC/142/3566. Sugar Mills monthly balances. CSR Co Ltd 1896 – 1902) 
DEBITS 
 
Month Coolie Chinese Fijian Javanese Japanese Cingalese Kanaka Supplies 
31 Oct 1896    289 9 6    311 17 8 943 - 7    6525 18 10 276 - 7 
30 Nov 1896    323 15 11    355 - 10 1185 1 7    6525 18 10 302 7 7 
31 Dec 1896    421 6 4    477 5 10 1507 15 2    7767 13 5 382 7 8 
Close of 
season 1896 
            587 13 9    3510 16 4 109 19 3 
31 March 
1897 
   53 8 10    1 - - 725 14 5    3777 13 - 111 16 1 
30 April 
1897 
   98 19 1    1 - - 824 2 6    3777 13 - 130 3 11 
31 May 1897    98 19 1    1 - - 828 - 1    3781 13 4 219 11 - 
30 June 1897    202 10 10    1 - - 1105 17 1    3825 9 1 322 13 9 
31 July 1897    246 9 7    1 - - 1303 8 10    4935 19 7 322 3 - 
31 August 
1897 
   300 5 3    1 - - 1333 15 2    6274 - - 348 15 2 
30 
September 
1897 
   346 19 1    1 - - 1436 5 7    6320 14 9 348 15 2 
31 October 
1897 
   389 10 11    1 - - 1555 5 4    6284 13 6 348 15 2 
30 Nov 1897    431 2 11    1 - - 1672 11 10    6296 15 2 372 16 1 
31 Dec 1897    543 - 5    1 - - 2178 - 1    7319 19 2 466 16 1 
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1 Various terms have been used to describe these people, including “Pacific islanders”, “Polynesians”, 
“South Sea islanders”, or “Kanakas”. The term “Kanakas” became a “term of derision” used to 
describe Pacific Island labourers (Berry, 2000, p. 111). It is now not used and will not be used in this 
paper except when referring to original documents or in a direct quotation. 
2 The American Civil War (1861 – 1865) caused a “serious disruption” to American sugar production 
and hence the European market was looking elsewhere for its supply (Andrew and Cook, 2000, p. 1). 
3 The Noel Butlin archives, located in Canberra, contain a wealth of well preserved, historical 
information about the workings of CSR. These records comprise annual reports and detailed 
correspondence between the head office and the various sugar mills and plantations, including Goondi. 
At the time of the conduct of the research, the Australian Sugar Industry Museum at Mourilyan 
contained a collection of sugar industry journals and some Goondi wage registers and accounts. 
4 The area under sugar cane expanded from 1,995 acres in 1867 to 28,026 acres in 1881, the quantity of 
sugar produced in that time increasing from 168 tons to 19,051 tons (NBAC/Z303, 1882). 
5 Local ecclesiastics urged people to “regard the kanaka as man and brother”, but instead they thought 
of him as a “black curse” (Pagani, 1989, p. 37). The influential British and Foreign Anti-Slavery 
Society mounted a vigorous campaign against the ill-treatment of coloured workers (Evans et al, 1975, 
pp 160 – 161).  
6 Labour unions were criticized for their insistence that Pacific islander labour be abolished, linking 
their policies to the potential detriment of northern Australian development (ASIM/SJ.SJTC, 1894g).  
7 At the time of the passing of the 1884 act excluding islanders from anything but agricultural labour, it 
was reported that Pacific islander labour cost 2/4d per day, compared to white labour, which cost 5/2d 
per day. In addition, islanders worked longer hours for more days per year (Parnaby, 1964, p. 130). 
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8 The British Colonial Office was critical of the system of recruiting. The British Government 
pressured the Queensland Government into issuing regulations requiring the presence of Government 
agents on all recruiting vessels (The Call for Recognition, 1992; Frost, 1996).  
9 Griffith swept into power in 1883 “by an overwhelming majority, proclaimed the champion of ‘White 
Australia’, of the little man, and of much besides” (Docker, 1970, p. 211). 
10 Permission to continue the practice of employing Pacific islanders was later extended to 1895 as a 
result of successful lobbying by the sugar industry. 
11 Sir Samuel Griffith’s government was defeated in 1888.  
12 Two of the three commissioners recommended the continuation of coloured labour, ascribing the 
depression in the industry to the threat of the new legislation (Parnaby, 1964). 
13 Griffith and McIlwraith, previously opposed, formed a coalition government in 1890 (Bolton, 2003).    
14 A letter to the Editor in the Brisbane Courier on 17th December 1881 (NBAC/Z303/, 1881) 
reinforced the belief about the unsuitability of work in the canefields for white workers, and linked the 
necessity of employing cheap labour to the economic importance of the sugar industry. It was reported 
that the colony’s clergymen arranged mass protests meetings condemning this practice (Morrison, 
1888). Alternative interpretations of this labour trade identified islanders’ agency in the process, and 
their motivations for involvement as coming from within their community rather than from outside 
coercion (Munro, 1995). 
15 The deportation of the Pacific islanders was described as one of the “darker aspects of Federation” 
(Sugar Heritage News, 2000, p. 2). 
16 The others were Homebush near Mackay and Victoria on the Herbert River (Robertson, 1991). CSR 
invested £200,000 into its “great” Victoria Mill near Ingham, which was reputed to have “everything – 
electric light, automatic feeding into the rollers …” (Docker, 1970, p. 173). 
17 The name “Goondi” was a widely used Aboriginal word meaning “big bend” or “bent elbow” 
(Robertson, 1991, p. 5). 
18 Edward W Knox was the son of the founder, Edward Knox. Based in Sydney, he was the General 
Manager of CSR, taking his seat on the board when his father returned to England on his retirement in 
1891 (NBAC/142/3527, 31 March 1891). He was known for the way in which he exercised stringent 
control over CSR’s distant operations (Hooks and Stewart, 2007).  
19 An 1898 letter from 17 farmers at Goondi (growing cane on land leased or purchased from CSR), 
recorded their undertaking to repay to the company within three years “the whole of the money 
expended in connexion with the introduction, landing & return passages of such labour (Polynesian), 
together with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum” (NBAC/N126/121).   
20 The salary of the Goondi mill manager, Mr Forster, was quite handsome, increasing from £345 in 
1888 to £445 in 1889 and £550 in 1890 and 1891 (NBAC/Z109/308). A great deal was expected of 
him. In a letter dated 30th January, 1891, from CSR’s General Manager Staff to Mr Forster, the 
manager was encouraged to improve his “indifferent” work of 1890 (NBAC/N126/92, 30 January 
1891).  
21 With the passing of the Pacific Island Labourers’ Amendment Act (Queensland) 1884, islanders 
were limited to employment only in agriculture in the tropics or sub-tropics, which excluded other 
trades and domestic or household services (Parnaby, 1964; Frost, 1996).  
22 According to Bolton (2003, p. 5), Townsville, as the “main entrepot” during the sugar boom, 
“naturally tended to favour the McIlwraith administration of 1879 – 1883, with its emphasis on 
developmental policies, lavish investment and tolerance of non-European labour”.  
23 The southern plantations of North America also operated with detailed accounting records (Flescher 
and Flescher, 1981; Razek, 1985; Fleischman and Tyson, 2000). 
24 The possibility of an increase in salary, or the threat of a decrease (NBAC/N126/92, 30 January 
1891) was a considerable performance incentive when Pacific islanders were receiving £6 per annum 
and keep, unskilled European workers received 20/- per week at the Goondi mill to work a 10 hour day, 
or a 12 hour day if required in the crushing season, and skilled workers could earn 12/- per day 
(NBAC/N74/50-51).  
25 Accounts were kept at Goondi for Cultivation, Cutters Wages, Fuel, General Charges, Chinese 
Labor, Kanaka Labor, Live Stock, Mill Wages, Rations, Maintenance of Plant, Working Expenses 
Sawmill, Working Expenses Tramways, Transport, and Wages (NBAC/N126/2, 17th March 1891). 
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European wages were included under “Mill Wages”, but Chinese and “Kanaka” labour were recorded 
separately, in keeping with CSR practice. 
26 Even the amount of flour consumed at the various mills came under the scrutiny of E W Knox at 
CSR’s Sydney office (NBAC/142/1457, 22nd April 1890, pp 39 – 40). 
